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T H E  UNITED STATES AND 
WORLD PEACE* 
THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE 
I" any consideration of current problems in world affairs and the position of the United States in the  total picture 
of the  re-establishment of world peace, one of the first nec- 
essary steps is tha t  of assessing the current situation. It 
behooves us t o  Iook a t  both the credit and the  debir side of 
our present moment in worId history, compare our situation 
with that  of similar postwar eras, and find if there be any 
foundation stones, no matter how out of place, upturned, or 
even perhaps broken, which we can assemble and use and 
build upon in erecting a structure of world order. 
Perhaps the first consideration which must be borne in 
mind in such an assessment is tha t  of recollecting that many 
of the  problems with which we are faced today are a result 
of the  dislocation and damage caused by the  war. This is, of 
course, a perfectly obvious point, but, like many other ob- 
vious points, it is sometimes overlooked. T h e  proportions and 
degree of this war damage and disIocation give us some idea 
of the  scope and magnitude of the  problems of the rehabili- 
tation of much of Europe and Asia, and the  re-establishment 
of peace on a world-wide basis. 
T h e  recent war has been referred to  as a trillion-dollar war. 
Now a trillion dollars is an amount of such size that  it is 
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difficult to  grasp, even by Americans who have been speaking 
freely of billions of dollars. This astronomical figure, however, 
scarcely covers direct military costs. Of the great powers of 
the  world it has been estimated that  the  United States spent 
about 300 billion dollars, Germany 280 billion, Russia 136 
billion, Britain 120 billion, Japan 49 billion, and France 34 
billion on direct war expenditures. There are further scattered 
estimates of the  costs of the war, such as the 61 billion dollars 
of war damage t o  Yugoslavia, 6 billion t o  Norway, and the  
10 billion or more dollars of damage t o  Holland, including the 
destruction of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, fines assessed by 
the Germans, depletion of stocks, occupational costs, and 
forced exports. 
The  French have estimated tha t  they have sustained losses 
of about 120 billion dollars and 1,200,000 people, of whom 
about twenty-five per cent died in battle and another twenty- 
five per cent were executed, massacred, or died in concentra- 
tion camps. During the war the  French population suffered 
a net  loss of over three per cent. The losses further extend to  
a list of homeless which includes almost ten per cent of the 
population, a loss of 1,200,000 dwellings, partially or totalIy 
destroyed, the  destruction of approximately another 500,000 
business and public buildings, and a very extensive crop loss. 
Estimates of Russia's war damage bring the  figure t o  about 
I30 billion dollars. The list of losses includes over 70,000 
towns and villages, 6,000,ooo buildings, tens of thousands of 
schooIs, libraries, and factories, 40,000 miles of railway track, 
13,000 bridges, and many milIions of head of horses, cattle, 
hogs, sheep, and goats. The Russian estimate includes some 
5,000,ooo soldiers and guerillas killed in the  war, and a total 
of lives lost in the  country approaching 20,000,000. 
The  total monetary losses due to the war, the loss in the 
most elemental and basic means of subsistence and sources of 
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foodstuffs, the almost complete economic disorganization in  
certain areas, the tremendous dislocation of populations, the  
many millions of people uprooted and transplanted, begin t o  
give an idea of the  reasons for some of the problems with 
which we are faced today. Our difficulties are all but over- 
whelming. Human ingenuity is taxed by the scope of t h e  
need. Were it not for one thing, we might despair of hoping 
that  the world would ever be reconstituted on any basis 
similar t o  that  which we have known in the past. That one 
condition is this: t o  a lesser degree wars in the  past have 
always been followed by similar situations. T h e  disruptions 
of economies, the loss of Iife, the disorganization of social ties 
and of political boundary lines, form a familiar postwar pat- 
tern which creates new difficulties a t  present only for two 
reasons, the magnitude of the  recent destruction and t h e  
complication of the atomic bomb. 
It may not be amiss, therefore, t o  remind ourseIves of t h e  
postwar situation after World War  I. I n  the  light of our 
current difficulties we are prone t o  think back t o  the period 
1918-1922 and come t o  the erroneous conclusion that  every- 
thing progressed smoothly, that  the  war was quickly brought 
t o  an end, and that  the treaties were promptly signed without 
major difficulties among the allies. The fact is, on the con- 
trary, tha t  the postwar period after 1918 was one in which 
the steps toward the  re-establishment of world peace and 
prosperity were not taken either as promptIy, or  as smoothly, 
as we are inclined t o  think. The Treaty of Versailles, we are  
all quite aware, was signed June 28, 1919. It did not come 
into force, however, until January 10,1920. T h e  treaties with 
Austria and Bulgaria were signed, respectively, in September 
and November of 1919, and each came into force some t e n  
months later. T h e  treaty with Hungary, however, was not  
signed until June 4, 1920, and did not come into force until 
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July 26, 1921, while the Treaty of SZvres with Turkey was 
signed in 1920, but was denounced by the Turkish govern- 
ment, with whom a new peace treaty was not concluded until 
July 24, 1923, a t  Lausanne, which treaty did not come into 
force until August 6, 1924. 
I n  connection with the treaties it perhaps should be added 
that, aIthough the United States signed the Treaty of Ver- 
sailIes in June of 1919, the Senate refused to concur in its 
ratification the following year, and it  was not until August 
25, 1921, that we concluded our own treaty of peace with 
Germany, which, it should be noted incidentally, was merely 
an adoption of nine of the fifteen parts of the Treaty of 
Versailles, word for word, including all the so-called iniqui- 
tous provisions regarding war guilt and reparations, but lack- 
ing only the first twenty-six articles, nameIy the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, the specific territorial delimitations, 
and Part XI11 on the International Labor Organization. The 
ratifications of this treaty were not exchanged until Armistice 
Day of 1921, but prior to  all this Congress officially reached 
the conclusion, by a joint resolution of July 2, 1921, that  we 
were no longer legally at war with Germany. President Tru- 
man's proclamation of December 31, 1946, declaring the 
cessation of hostilities, did not legally end the state of war, 
but was a first step in that direction in terms of internaI 
wartime controls. 
In  addition t o  the fact that the peace treaties were not in 
reaIity all completed and brought into force promptly after 
the First World War, is the further fact that on t he  con- 
structive side of postwar internationa1 relations the period 
following 1918 also left much to  be desired. After t he  First 
World War the League of Nations was made an integral part 
of the new foundations of the peace, but the League never 
included the United States. It did not include Germany until 
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1926, and did not include the Soviet Union until 1934. Other 
constructive aspects of international relations t o  a consider- 
able extent waited upon the estabIishment and organization 
of the League. I n  other words, as i t  has been described, peace 
was organized from the top down, and i t  was several years 
before there came into operation the subsidiary organizations 
of the League whose functions were to  aid in world health, 
prosperity, and morality, and reduce the number of potential 
causes of war. 
I n  the third place, i t  may finally be added t h a t  the postwar 
era following 1918 was not, as we fondly tend t o  assume, in 
fact a period of peace. Many corners of the world were torn 
by minor wars and insurrections, any one of which in  a 
different setting might have been a contributory cause to- 
ward a major conflict. British, American, and Japanese troops 
intervened in the Soviet Union t o  t ry  t o  prevent the success 
of the Bolshevik government. Although the number of troops 
by these outside powers was limited, i t  is an interesting 
commentary on our thinking a t  the  time tha t  we built a 
permanent building as the American barracks in Vladivostok. 
We perhaps need t o  be reminded that in 1919 and 1920 
both Russia and Poland separately invaded Lithuania, and 
that  between these incursions major military operations were 
carried out in which Russian troops forced their way t o  the  
gates of Warsaw and then were driven back by the Poles the  
hundred odd miles t o  Brest-Litovsk. We may  have forgotten 
also that  the treaty of peace with Turkey, referred to a 
moment ago, came only after a sizable "war after the war" 
in which allied troops, chiefly Greek, advanced to  within 
some sixty miles of Ankara, the new Turkish capital, and 
were in the end repulsed and forced to  evacuate from Smyrna 
as late as September of 1922. 
We are inclined t o  overlook also the revolts of the subject 
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peoples and the forceful attempts, generally unsuccessful, of 
the  Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Indians, and, as late as 
1925, the Syrians t o  effect their independence. All in all, a 
backward glance a t  the years succeeding World War I should 
lead us t o  the  conclusion that  our present world, in terms of 
the signing of the treaties and the re-establishment of peace, 
is perhaps inching along a t  not much less than a normal rate, 
that  in terms of overt violence we have in China, Greece, and 
Indo-China what might be expected as a normal situation, 
and tha t  we have in the Near East and Europe, generally 
speaking, more peace and quiet, albeit because of military 
occupation, than we should expect. 
Although our progress warrants no moment for relaxation 
and self-congratulation, after having viewed this earlier pic- 
ture our present plight appears, if not brighter, perhaps a 
little less futile and hopeless than many have assumed. If it 
took five years t o  complete the  peace treaties after the  First 
World War, we should not be excessively discouraged with 
only five preliminary treaties completed in eighteen months. 
T h a t  is, admittedly, not a very fair comparison. It is evident 
tha t  after the last war the German treaty was the one of 
major importance, as i t  is today, and it may be stated, as 
many a writer has done, tha t  we are getting the cart before 
the  horse in drawing up our less important treaties first. I n  
many ways tha t  is probably a correct appraisal, and yet, in 
terms of procedural questions and certain of the approaches 
on the German treaty, it may conceivabIy be said that, hav- 
ing drawn up the  less important treaties first, the German 
treaty will be easier to  negotiate. If this reverse order results 
in a better German treaty, i t  will have compensated some- 
what for the delay. 
Obviously, the  negotiation of the German treaty will not 
be facilitated unless the various great powers within and 
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among themselves can develop greater clarity and consist- 
ency in what they believe a desirable policy toward Ger- 
many. Until the present moment they are not sufficientIy 
agreed for the  establishment of a central government in 
Germany capable of accepting a treaty of peace. Inciden- 
tally, it should be noted that  those who have been most 
insistent on the necessity for an early peace treaty with Ger- 
many rarely seem agitated by the  lack of progress toward a 
treaty with the other major enemy, Japan. 
In  regard t o  the constructive aspects of world organization, 
our postwar period compares quite favorably with the period 
following 1918. This may be less a matter of virtue, states- 
manship, and foresight, than i t  is the  natural tendency t o  
build upon previous practice, but the fact is that  within less 
than a year after the close of the war the United Nations 
Organization had been set up and was taking its first steps 
as a going concern. I n  this connection it should be pointed 
out that  the various countries of the world are taking the 
United Nations seriously in terms of the caliber of men sent 
as representatives, as well as in the gravity of the questions 
submitted for consideration. 
I n  addition t o  the establishment of the Assembly and 
Security Council of the  United Nations, and in no less strik- 
ing a fashion, the  simultaneous development of the Economic 
and Social Council and subsidiary organizations such as the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organ- 
ization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Provi- 
sional International Civil Aviation Organization, and the  
Bretton Woods setup of the International Monetary Fund 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment shows an interesting effort to  build the peace this time, 
particularly on the constructive side, not merely from the 
top down, as was the  case in 1920, but concurrently from the 
United States and World Peace 
bottom up.. If wars are caused in part by food shortages, 
economic restrictions, the kind of friction that may arise over 
a lack of rules for civil aviation, and a general absence of 
international understanding, it may clearly be said that we 
are more active in our efforts at such war prevention at  the 
moment than we were following World War I. 
In  addition to these general considerations regarding the 
re-establishment of peace, there are certain special questions, 
some new, some old, which require particular consideration. 
Probably the first of these is the matter of the very sizable 
number of troops of the great allied powers scattered about 
over the world. Americans have been considerably irked by 
the large number of Russian troops in most of eastern Eu- 
rope. The Russians, on the other hand, have indicated their 
irritation at American troops in China, Iceland, and the 
Japanese Islands, and at  British troops in Greece, the Near 
East, and, earlier, in Indonesia. Both we and the Russians 
should remember, however, and make allowance for the fact, 
that these troops are, with almost no exception, precisely 
where they were located at the cessation of hostilities. 
It is true that the Russian influence is much greater in 
eastern Europe and probably greater in the Far East than 
it  has ever been before because of another phenomenon which 
deserves some explanation. Throughout its modern history 
Russia has faced, around most of its eastern and southern 
perimeter, and particularly on its western boundary, more or 
less continuous political pressure from one or more great 
powers. Japan has now disappeared as a great power. China 
is rent by internal dissension, although, paradoxically, she is 
more free from many-sided external influence than she has 
been for over a century. Britain is relatively weaker from 
China to Turkey than she has been since Napoleon. And in 
Europe, where Russia has had to face the might of a strong 
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Sweden, Poland, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, 
there is an almost complete absence of political power be- 
tween herself and France. 
Politics is a form of nature which, like other forms, cer- 
tainly abhors a vacuum. I n  the same way that  the  great 
powers were in the nineteenth century irresistibly drawn 
into the vortex of the decaying Ottoman Empire in what is 
commonly referred t o  as the Eastern Question, Russia is 
naturally being drawn toward Manchuria, China, India, the 
Middle East, and particularly toward central Europe. Were 
Russia the least imperialistically minded of the powers, she 
could hardly stop the extension of her sphere of influence into 
these vacuum areas, and particularly into a predominant 
position in central Europe, until she meets the pressure of 
the influence of some other great power. Present-day Russia, 
not being noticeably reluctant t o  extend its power, is quite 
naturally tending t o  fill this vacuum.'In the Far East it is 
meeting and will continue t o  meet the power of the United 
States, I n  the rest of Asia i t  is meeting and will continue t o  
meet the power of Britain, which, however, is in the process 
of diminishing, particularly in India. I n  Europe she meets 
no really competitive power east of the  British and American 
zones of Germany. I n  such a situation i t  is certainIy no won- 
der that  in Europe, a t  least, Russia has secured the zone of 
so-called friendly governments which she desired. 
Another one of our special questions, which in this case is 
something of a repetition of that  of 19x9, is the difficulty 
which results from the political immaturity of many of the  
peoples of the world. T h e  United Nations has taken as one 
of its premises the ultimate independence of the various 
national groups. T h e  fact is, however, that  the ability of 
certain of these peoples t o  stand alone, as the League of Na- 
tions Covenant put it, varies tremendousIy from country t o  
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country. The  internal responsibilities for law and order and 
self-government, and the external responsibilities of meeting 
one's international obligations in a community of nations, are 
t h k g s  which are difficult to  impress upon groups of people for 
the first time feeling the freedom of national independence. 
I n  the past such political irresponsibility and immaturity 
have been taken advantage of very often by imperialistic 
powers. Now, presumably such aggressive imperialism is not 
t o  take place. The problem of tutelage still remains, however, 
and the question arises as t o  the basis on which such im- 
mature nations can be taught their national responsibilities. 
This does not necessarily mean that  political maturity 
implies that  these young nations should do things in our way. 
As a matter of fact, we should hope that  they will learn to  
solve their problems in a better way than we have met some 
of ours, but there is a danger, in leaving them t o  an utterly 
free choice, that  they may not follow a pattern likely to  
promote the general welfare. I n  other words, what happens 
if a newly independent nation, such as the Philippines or the 
Indonesian Republic, should set up a dictatorship? We have 
blithely assumed that, if states became independent, they 
would? of their free choice, establish democracies. It just may 
be, however, that  this, a t  least in the short run, will not 
always be the case. 
Presumably, the test should be an international test and 
the  criterion should be whether the new states are peace- 
loving members of the international community, rather than 
whether they are democracies, as we understand the term. 
On the other hand, the democracies are thus presented with 
an even more impelling responsibility t o  demonstrate the 
superior value of their form of government to  those who are 
newly presented with a free opportunity t o  choose their own 
political institutions. 
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Another question, stemming from the fact that  problems 
of foreign policy create pecufiar responsibiIities in a democ- 
racy, is the presentation and our digesting of news and in- 
formation on foreign affairs. We are blessed in this country 
with the best news coverage available to  anybody on earth. 
We are blessed, moreover, with a coverage that  is the most 
free from governmental restraint and censorship. The pres- 
entation of the news which comes t o  us is not merely the best * 
in the world. It is the best in the history of the world. 
The handling of this news, the fact that  i t  is necessarily 
less than complete, and our reception of it, however, make it 
diflicult to  place this information in its proper focus and 
perspective. Such an avalanche of selected facts and inter- 
pretation rolls in upon us every day that  it is easy t o  reach 
the conclusion that  it is all of equal and vital importance. 
The radio commentators, more than the newspapers, tend t o  
reinforce this assumption by giving us much of the news in 
a voice tense with the emotion of describing breathtaking 
and worldshaking events. Now, the fact is that  there are 
some days, and even some weeks, when there are no breath- 
taking and worldshaking events. The newspapers t ry  to  
indicate the  varying importance of their dispatches by the 
size of headlines and the position that  the news is given in 
the newspapers. This type of evaluation of foreign news, 
however, is subjected to  the vagaries of the news in compet- 
ing fields. Unfortunately for international understanding, the 
great international conferences have to  take their chances in 
our newspapers with local murders, overwhelming acts of 
nature, the World Series, and even John L. Lewis. 
Part of the exaggeration of the sense of urgency and im- 
portance imparted to  the foreign news is the fault of the 
statesmen themselves. Some of their arguments are not as 
important as their words would indicate. It does seem, for 
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example, tha t  the  tremendous importance which Mr. Byrnes 
and Mr. Molotov, respectively, placed on two different dates 
for the opening of the Paris Peace Conference last summer 
was out of all proportion t o  the intrinsic value of either one. 
Who among us remembers that  date? And yet at the time 
one would have thought that  there was no more important 
substantive issue before the conference than the date on 
which i t  was to  convene. 
And, speaking of statesmen, we are faced with yet another 
question. It is certainly a cruel and tragic historic jest that  
the  world is presented a t  this critical time with double in- 
adequacy in the leadership of its international relations. I n  
the  first place, major responsibility for the peace of the world 
comes t o  rest naturally in the hands of the  two strongest 
powers, which, unfortunately, by history, tradition, and 
inclination are the least capable of assuming vast world 
responsibilities a t  this time. Every other great power except 
Japan has had more experience, more knowledge, and more 
awareness of the  problems of world politics than the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 
Similarly, it is a sad chance that  finds several relatively 
inexperienced individuals in the positions of responsibility in 
the three great powers whose fate it is to  determine in the 
near future the question of world peace. This is not presented 
as any reflection on the abilities of the men charged with the 
execution of the  foreign policy within their respective coun- 
tries, all of whom evidence considerable rapid learning. T h e  
plain fact is, however, that ,  as in any other great and com- 
~ l i c a t e d  business, there is a tremendous amount of know-how 
in the administration of a foreign policy, which, like other 
technical knowledge in any important administrative enter- 
prise, can be learned only the hard way, by experience. It is 
fantastic that  a t  this critical hour there should be such a 
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small background of experience in international affairs t o  be 
found in the leadership of the three great powers. 
American leadership has changed almost entirely at the 
top since the death of President Roosevelt less than two 
short years ago. Prior to  that there had been a considerabIe 
continuity, but when, at the close of the war, need for con- 
structive leadership is greatest, we have a new president and 
a new secretary of state, whose experiences in the Senate and 
elsewhere were not especially directed along the lines of 
foreign relations. Similarly, in Great Britain between VE 
Day and VJ Day foreign affairs were taken out of the hands 
of a prime minister long connected with Britain's foreign 
policy, and a young foreign minister of very considerable 
experience in foreign affairs. Even in the Soviet Union we 
find the head of their Foreign Office with a relatively short 
prior peacetime experience, as a successor in 1939 to  Litvinov, 
who had had a much longer and more varied background in 
the direction of Soviet foreign relations, In all three nations 
there is only one person, Marsha1 Stalin, who presents a 
considerable continuity of personality in administrative of- 
fice; and, although his responsibilities for foreign poIicy have 
always been of very great importance, even he lacks the 
experience of foreign travel and participation in a wide vari- 
ety of international contacts and conferences abroad that  are 
helpful in meeting international issues as they arise. Interest- 
ingly enough, our major continuity does not come from the 
administrative side at all, but from Senators Connally and 
Vandenberg. 
In the current situation with all its general dislocations, 
friction, and destruction and all its special difficulties, we are 
faced with certain short-run and long-run problems. The 
short-run problems revolve about the question of the legal 
re-establishment of the community of nations, the formation 
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of the new footing upon which the defeated states can begin 
again t o  have peacetime relations with the rest of the world, 
the question, in short, of the peace treaties. 
Now, it must be pointed out that  a peace treaty re- 
establishes peace only in a technical manner of speaking. It 
does not itself re-establish all the prewar relationships of 
trade, commerce, and international good will. It merely sets 
up the legal skeleton upon which the substance of the body 
of the international community may take form. I n  so far as 
a peace treaty does not in itself re-establish the complete, 
harmonious relations of the states of the world, there cannot 
be what might be called a good peace treaty. With every 
treaty much is left to  its later development and to the use 
which the nations make of it. This difficulty of even approx- 
imately meeting the responsibilities of a peace conference has 
been admirably stated in the fifth volume of the monumental 
work, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, edited by 
H. VJ. V. Temperley, probably the leading historian of the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919: 
The great and absorbing preoccupation of a Peace Confer- 
ence is, or ought to be, to make peace. Until peace is made, the 
state of war continues; an armistice is not peace; and every 
day that the state of war continues is an untold misfortune to 
all concerned, even though fighting has ceased. The urgent 
necessity is to bind up the severed ties, to set going once more 
the current of life between countries, which was blocked by 
the war, and to do i t  as quickly as possible. It is necessary to 
insist on this truism, because it is so apt to be forgotten by 
brilliant and inventive critics. A Conference must aim a t  the 
possible, not the ideal. Otherwise, i t  will dissolve in long 
academic discussions, and lose sight of its practical object. It 
is fatal for i t  to be ambitious. If it can make peace quickly, and 
a t  the same time do nothing to prevent future development on 
sound lines, i t  has done a very great deal, and as much as can 
be expected of it. Some people expect too much of a Confer- 
ence, and bitter disappointment is the inevitable resuIt. In  
matters financial and economic there is no finality. Boundaries 
can be fixed, and if they are rightly fixed can be expected to 
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endure for a considerable period, and to become part of the 
permanent framework of nations, Even if the boundaries are 
badly drawn, it often happens that  they become accepted. But 
economic and financial relations cannot be fixed with the same 
definity and permanence. They are constantly growing or 
changing. No treaty which deals with such matters can do 
more than mark a certain stage, adjust difficulties which 
have already arisen, and give a fair opportunity to the future 
t o  develop on good lines. 
Moreover, every peace treaty carries within itself certain 
elements of punishment, as well as reconstruction, and very 
often these two elements are a t  variance with each other. 
Historically, victors have almost universally imposed on 
vanquished one or more of the  following limitations: dis- 
armament of some kind, including demilitarization and the 
razing of fortresses, certain annexations of territory, or a t  
least rectifications of frontiers, and some indemnity or repa- 
ration. 
All of these provisions may in various cases have the 
aspects of both punishment and reconstruction. DemiIitariz- 
ing the  enemy may be both punishment and a contribution 
t o  future peace. Reparations may be looked upon at the same 
time as both fines and damages, and although many boundary 
changes may be criticized as being purely in the nature of 
territorial larceny, there have been many cases of boundary 
changes which may be fairly considered as introducing a 
greater justice t o  the borderlands concerned. As a matter of 
fact, it is extremely unwise t o  commit oneself emotionally t o  
the fairness or justice of many of the international boundaries 
of the world. I n  such areas of mixed-up populations as we 
find in southeastern Europe, for example, one may say with 
some accuracy that  there is no such thing as a just boundary. 
The  Russians have a saying that  what is good for a Russian 
will kill a German; but it  is equally true that  in Transylvania 
what is just for Rumanians may be unjust for Hungarians; 
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and in that  geographic expression known as Macedonia, if by 
any stretch of the imagination a settlement could be achieved 
which would be fair t o  Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia, it 
would be looked upon as manifestly unfair by most of the  
local inhabitants, who consider themselves not true citizens 
of the states mentioned, but Macedonians. 
I n  the  long run, on the other hand, our problems are less 
those of the immediate drafting of peace treaties, although 
the new status quo set up by the peace treaties is a condition 
~receden t  for the  solution of long-run problems. They are 
more the  reconstruction of the  peaceful channels of world 
poIitics and world economic relations, the recognition of a 
community of interests in the  nations of the world, and the 
building of an international political structure which will aid 
in the positive and constructive aspects of these problems, 
as well as deter and possibly prevent destructive outbreaks 
of violence. 
A war situation arises when there is a conjict of interests 
between two nations or groups of nations which they con- 
sider worth fighting for, and when each nation or group of 
nations thinks, if the test is submitted t o  the test of force, 
that  i t  has a chance t o  win. This analysis poses a fundamental 
problem of international government. We must be prepared 
t o  reduce and, as far as possible, t o  eliminate the sources and 
causes of international frictions that  may result in open war. 
At  the same time we should, if possible, establish an inter- 
national authority of sufficient strength and prestige so tha t  
no state will consider when its interests are in question that, 
if it resorts t o  the use of force against this international 
authority, i t  has a fair chance t o  win. The  violent aggressors 
in our time did not plunge their countries into war with the 
intention tha t  i t  would add t o  the illustrious pages of our 
military history and that  of our allies. Hitler, Mussolini, and 
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the Japanese war lords embarked upon their expeditions of 
conquest, we must not forget, in the expectation that they 
would win. In  the future it is clear that  the need is for inter- 
national sanctions strong enough so that it is evident in 
advance that the chances are that such a resort to  force will 
not be victorious. 
As m e  views the difficulties besetting the path to  world 
peace, certain rather obvious obstacles and questions arise. 
In  the first place, if there should be any degree of good will 
common to the victorious powers, the natural and most easy 
assumption in regard to  the dangers to  the peace would arise 
in regard t o  the states which have just been defeated. Ger- 
many, Japan, and, t o  a lesser extent, their satellites are fulI 
of revenge. I n  spite of our efforts to re-educate them, they 
have shown a very human resistance to  such re-education. 
The result is that one miy confidently expect that, if the 
Germans and Japanese were by any chance permitted at  any 
early date to  acquire the strength to  re-embark upon the 
path of war, they would in all likelihood do so without the 
slightest compunction. Their economic, political, and par- 
ticularly boundary situations are such that they feel that 
they have in full measure the first criterion for the outbreak 
of war, namely a conflict of interests worth fighting about. 
Unless the Germans and the Japanese have acquired a greater 
sense of peace and responsibility for the international com- 
munity than vanquished states usually show, they would be 
quite willing to  change their present status by a resort to  
force, if they believed that there was any chance that such a 
resort to  force would be victorious. Germany and Japan then 
are the first keys to  world peace. 
To  a number of students of international affairs it is an 
axiom that Germany and Japan cannot forcibly disturb the 
peace of the world. As of the present moment, I think we can 
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all agree no one believes that  these powers are abIe to  make 
an overt attempt t o  overthrow the present situation by a 
resort to  force. The question is one for the future, five years, 
ten years, or twenty years hence. The Germany of 1918 was 
hardly in a better position to  deny the will of its conquerors 
than is the Germany of 1947, but in less than twenty-one 
years the new and revived and remilitarized Germany was 
inflicting on Poland a lightning war, the impact of which had 
never before been seen in all the annals of military history. 
From time to  time we have received in this country reports 
of certain observers who have been to  Germany and Japan, 
particularly the former. They have often arrived at two 
conclusions. The first is that Germany has no military 
strength or power of revival, and is no threat to  the peace. 
The second, delivered almost in the same breath, is that if 
we do not cut Germany's heavy industry and particularIy 
the armament business, if we free the Nazi leaders, if we do 
not supervise Germany in one way or another for at least 
twenty years, Germany will again set out upon the path of 
aggressive war. One cannot, therefore, assume it as perma- 
nently axiomatic that Germany and Japan cannot start 
another war. It is one of our duties t o  see that they cannot, 
preferably, of course, that  they do not desire to, but prac- 
tically that they shall be unable t o  build again the forces 
which would make possible another major conflict. 
Most students of international affairs, however, are quite 
aware of the fact that the powers who are at present most 
able to  resort to  force in the pursuit of their objectives are 
not the late losers, but are the powers that were victorious 
in the recent war. Very frankly, a source of possible conflict 
in the near future may arise from the relations between 
Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Thus, the 
relations of these great powers are, if possible, worthy of 
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even fuller study than the threat of the late Axis aggressors. 
There is one final consideration which should be presented 
in concluding the picture of the status quo. The question 
often arises as t o  the  immediacy of the likelihood that  open 
conflict will again break out. I n  this connectiiin it should be 
observed tha t  there appears t o  be in international affairs a 
more or less distinguishable difference between what might 
be called a postwar and a prewar era. Following World War 
I the world had something over a decade in which t o  bind 
up its wounds. Efforts were made toward the  re-establish- 
ment of peace in terms of adjusred political boundaries, 
establishment of peaceful procedures for the settlement of 
disputes, the setting up of an  international organization, 
suggestions for disarmament, and efforts for international 
economic collaboration. During that  time, in spite of the 
minor wars which have been alluded to, there was no dis- 
position, coupled with ability, on the  part of any great power 
forcibly t o  disturb the general international situation. 
With the Japanese campaigns in Manchuria in 1931 and 
a t  Shanghai in 1932, German remilitarization in 1935 and 
reoccupation of the RhineIand in 1936, and the entrance by 
Italy into a war with Ethiopia in 1935, however, a prewar 
era was clearly begun in which particularly the last two of 
these great powers publicly proclaimed their desire t o  over- 
turn the  existing status quo, both regionally and generally, 
by a resort to armed force. With such clear and unequivocaI 
statements of aggressive intention, accompanied by corrk- 
sponding actions, the likelihood of a major war became in- 
creasingly serious. I n  such an era i t  is obvious that the pro- 
spective victims of aggression should not merely strive t o  keep 
their powder dry, but should follow a policy of rearmament 
and seeking alliances in an effort t o  meet the evident threat. 
A postwar period, on the other hand, is characterized by the  
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prostration of the Iosers and the exhaustion and demobiliza- 
tion of the winners, and is generally susceptible of all kinds 
of constructive efforts toward keeping the peace. In such a 
period the outbreak of a world war seems generally improb- 
able, and time is available for constructive peace efforts. 
Observation of our current period leads one to believe that 
we are now in such a postwar era. There is no immediate 
threat to  the general peace from Germany, Italy, Japan, or 
the satellite states. Current talk of war, and the amount of 
this prevalent in the United States amazes every visitor or 
returning American, proceeds from the theory that an early 
outbreak of open hostilities between the United States and 
the Soviet Union is likely. On the face of the evidence, one 
can hardly conclude that  this is the case. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union not merely have very great 
reason for wanting a period of peace; they have greatly de- 
mobilized their armed forces in the last year and a half. Russia 
has no navy worthy of the name. She apparently has no 
atomic bomb. Neither does she have a strategic air force. 
Our navy, like our army, has suffered greatIy in efficiency 
from a period of demobilization, and our air force is certainly 
far below what anyone would call combat strength. More- 
over, there is no clear indication in either country that any 
branch of its armed forces is currently being built up t o  
wartime combat strength. 
At the same time, the two powers are consistently and 
continuously seeking to  settle between themselves their out- 
standing political issues. These efforts are not proceeding 
rapidly, or too successfully, but there is no indication that 
either is seriously contemplating dropping such negotiations 
and preparing to settle these issues by a resort to  force. 
As opposed to  a prewar era, in which every measure should 
be taken in view of a nation's defense needs, certain other 
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policies become possible in a postwar era, in which, appar- 
ently, we currently find ourselves. This is a period for dis- 
armament, It is a period t o  establish a new and, if possible, 
more just statur quo among the  nations. It is, thirdly, a period 
in which we should bend every effort t o  the achievement of 
multilateral steps for the maintenance and preservation of 
peace. 
It may be said, also, that  in a postwar period there is less 
need of urgency than there is in a prewar era. Peace is always 
an urgent matter, but in a postwar period deliberation is not 
fatal. We have seen, within the last few months, many out- 
standing issues on which we differed from the Russians reach 
a reasonably acceptable compromise solution by patient 
effort, extending over a long period of time. As of any given 
moment, some international questions have no solution. If 
two diametrically opposite views are maintained, i t  may be 
better in some cases not t o  raise as an issue a dash of opinion, 
but t o  postpone for solution such a problem which may be- 
come easier t o  solve when subsidiary questions are settIed, 
or when conditions which have led t o  an intransigent attitude 
on the part of one, or both powers, may have changed. This 
also is different from the situation in a prewar era, in which 
every postponement, every hesitation, every sidestepping of 
a major issue, may in fact lead t o  disaster. I n  a postwar 
period there is no time t o  waste, but  undue haste should not 
endanger the quality of decisions; and we have certainly seen 
some cases, as, for example, the Trieste question, on which a 
solution was impossible during the year 1945, brought t o  a 
kind of compromise settlement during the year 1946. 
Our current situation is not exactly rosy. Our problems 
are all but overwhelming. T h e  path before us is rough and 
steep, and with one misstep we may, with our atomic bomb, 
go bouncing off into oblivion. But the situation is neither an 
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act of God, nor some Greek tragedy inevitably compelling us 
toward impending doom. We are face to face with man-made 
problems, most of which, down through history, have been 
met many times before. They must be susceptible of solution 
by man. Intrinsic to  such a solution is the relation of the 
great powers, which will be the theme of the-next lecture. 
